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GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE SYSTEMS OF SPATIAL GOVERNANCE 
AND PLANNING: A EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Inadequate regulation of spatial development is at the origin of the current global crisis and 
increases, in years of crisis, the unequal distribution of wealth. The importance of the related 
risks for democracy draws attention to the systems of spatial governance and planning, 
through which States regulate the spatial development. In Europe, the countries most affected 
by the unequal effects of the crisis have spatial planning systems that are traditionally based 
on the preventive assignation of rights for land use and development through a plan. The 
systems of other countries had established beforehand that new rights for land use and for 
spatial development are rather assigned only after the public control of development projects 
and their distributional effects. Despite the evidence that some models can operate better than 
others in ensuring the public government of the spatial development, the improvement of 
spatial planning systems is however limited by their complex nature of “institutional 
technologies”. Especially in a context of crisis, planners are responsible for the increase of 
public awareness concerning the role of spatial governance in economic and social life. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
The political and technical practices used to order space play an essential role in all societies 
(Sassen, 2006). Any social and economic activity needs a space to take place and, through the 
ordering of space, can therefore be promoted, addressed or, if necessary, prevented. 
Moreover, due to their deep involvement in the economic and social life, such practices 
contribute to shape the citizenship in places concerned by their action (Mazza, 2015). 
Although, for the reasons given, the origin of the spatial governance processes and of spatial 
planning practices is lost in the mists of time, their contemporary characters took shape with 
the establishment of the modern State. Every State in the world provides constitutional 
functions of spatial governance, thus setting also the conditions for the technical development 
and social affirmation of spatial planning in its institutional context. By virtue of 
constitutional powers, States exert the public control of spatial development through their 
respective ‘systems’ of spatial governance and planning. Implying the comprehensive action 
of legal devices, administrative bodies and technical cultures, these can be described as 
complex ‘institutional technologies’ (Janin Rivolin, 2012) that allow and rule the spatial 
development in each institutional context, with the resulting consequences for the life of 
entire cities, regions and countries. 
 
Due to its long history and the most recent events, Europe has a variety of characteristics, 
which is also reflected in the different ways of ordering space through the spatial governance 
and planning. Foremost, the European continent is characterized by a very large number of 
independent States (almost a quarter of the world’s nations) in relation to its total land area, 
which is the smallest of the continents, with Oceania, amounting to less than a quarter of 
America and Asia and about one-third of Africa. However, this can hardly suggest the 
extreme diversity of the European territory, which is made more evident by the wide variety 
of environments, landscapes, cultures and languages (Dubbini, 2002), consolidated in modern 
times within relatively circumscribed spaces of territorial sovereignty, the States.  
 
The particularity of Europe is recognized also for the existence of the European Union (EU), a 
supranational organization of currently 28 member States that, however, does not hold formal 
powers of spatial governance and planning (Faludi, 2002; Janin Rivolin, 2010; Zonneveld et 
al., 2012; Schmitt and Van Well, 2016). In promoting ‘informal’ spatial policies, the process 
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 3 
of EU integration has nevertheless pushed for almost 30 years the comparative study of 
systems, cultures and practices of spatial governance and planning in the European States 
(Davies et al., 1989; Healey and Williams, 1993; Newman and Thornley, 1996; CEC, 1997; 
Balchin et al., 1999; Larsson, 2006; Janin Rivolin, 2008; Nadin and Stead, 2008, 2009; 
Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009; Muñoz Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010; Nadin, 2012; Reimer 
et al., 2014). The results of this long-term comparison can be valuable to understand how 
different systems of spatial governance and planning influence the economic and social life in 
respective institutional contexts, therefore exhibiting also different impacts on the current 
global crisis. One assumption in support of this argument is the evidence that ‘[i]n its causes 
and consequences, the global financial crisis of 2008 was fundamentally an urban 
phenomenon’ (Siemiatycki and Siemiatycki, 2016, p. 1258). Another is the ‘evidence that the 
perception of the impact of the crisis on planning has been different in different regions of 
Europe’ (Kunzmann, 2016, p. 1317). 
 
Although the functions of a spatial governance and planning system can be generalizable (e.g. 
Healey and Williams, 1993; Mazza, 2003), these comparative studies have shown that 
systems developed over the last century in Europe operate in different ways, producing 
different specific and overall outcomes by virtue of the legal, technical and cultural 
characteristics that are attributed in various institutional contexts. With particular respect to 
the modalities of assigning rights for land use and for spatial development, the course of 
history has delivered in the world and within Europe a variety of models, which are discussed 
and compared in this paper. Without disregarding the major variables involved in the 
phenomenology of the current crisis – such as the various features of the ‘neoliberal turn’ 
(Brenner et al., 2010), the role of different fiscal policies (Cottarelli et al., 2014) and the 
varying behaviours of market investors (Mattarocci and Pakdemir, 2015) –, the proposed 
comparison is aimed at discussing how different systems of spatial governance and planning 
can affect differently the economic, social and even political life of a country. This may 
contribute to explain some main differences in the long run, and to suggest why, at least in 
Europe, some countries are suffering the unequal effects of the current crisis more strongly 
than others. 
 
The next section highlights the crucial role of space in determining the unequal effects of the 
current crisis and shows how inequality is distributed differently in the EU countries. The 
following section illustrates the development of comparative research on spatial governance 
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 4 
and planning systems in Europe as a context for the analysis. On this basis, the section after 
distinguishes the features and effects of the so-called ‘conformative’, ‘performative’ and ‘neo-
performative’ models of spatial planning systems, which are currently in operation throughout 
Europe, arguing that the first model is a contributory cause of the unequal effects of the crisis. 
A further section considers whether the current crisis could be also an opportunity for the 
renovation of the systems of spatial governance and planning that are less effective. The last 
section rounds off the contribution by summing up the main findings, which indicate a 
possible commitment for planners. 
 
 
Space and the effects of global crisis in Europe 
 
Since modernity, the role of space in economic and social life ‘is less and less neutral, more 
and more active, both as instrument and as goal, as means and as end’ (Lefebvre, 1992, p. 
411). And more and more this has to deal with politics, since a ‘politicized space destroys the 
political conditions that brought it about’, and often ‘the management and appropriation of 
such a space run counter to the state’ (ibid., p. 416). This has become even more evident 
under the cultural conditions of postmodernity, insofar as space can be more ‘flexibly’ 
exploited for purposes of power (Harvey, 1989). Indeed, no one should forget that the current 
global crisis, originating from the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, was triggered by a 
generalized financial speculation on the housing market under the lack of adequate 
regulations (Zandi, 2010; TFCIC, 2011). Moreover, due to the lack of adequate regulations, 
urban markets are worldwide the main ‘space’ through which the crisis is being metabolized 
through privatizing gains and socializing losses (Forrest and Yip, 2011; Fujita, 2011; Harvey, 
2012).  
 
According to Thomas Piketty (2014), one effect of the current crisis is that in many countries 
the capital (i.e. wealth in the form of real estate property and financial assets) is growing now 
at a faster pace than the economy (more precisely, with a growth rate of 4-5% vs. 1-1.5% per 
year). The income produced by capital tends to be concentrated in the hands of a small group 
of people, while labour income is dispersed through the entire population, although with 
notable contractions and the consequent use of social welfare and public spending. 
Considering that wage growth depends on the growth of the economy as a whole, if the latter 
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 5 
is slower than the increase of capital income, the unequal distribution of wealth appears 
destined to be screwed into a spiral of very serious growth. Aside from suggesting the solid 
interests in favour of the continuation of the crisis, Piketty’s analysis casts ominous shadows 
beyond its technical findings, as history has shown that, beyond certain limits, social 
inequality ends up undermining the most solid democracies (Fukuyama, 2011); a risk that, 
seventy years after the second world war, has apparently become topical again even in 
wealthy Europe (Regan, 2013). 
 
Although Europe is considered as a whole one of the continents most developed and richest in 
the world, the high diversity of the States that compose it is confirmed by differences of 
indicators of productive capacity and of well-being. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2016), the distribution of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the world in 2015 
varies in Europe between the 4th position of Germany and the 154th of Montenegro, and GDP 
per capita varies between the 2nd position of Luxembourg and the 104th of Kosovo. While the 
whole EU competes with the main economies of the world (Figure 1), the level of national 
wealth is highly variable within its borders (Figure 2).  
 
FIGURE 1 INDICATIVELY HERE 
 
FIGURE 2 INDICATIVELY HERE 
 
Southern European countries are known in general as the EU member States that have been 
most affected by the current crisis, and those where the unequal distribution of wealth and its 
increase are more evident. ‘PIGS’ is an offensive acronym used in economics and finance, 
popularized during the European sovereign-debt crisis of the late 2000s, which refers usually 
to the economies of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (Dawber, 2015). These countries were 
unable to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their own 
(therefore the term became ‘PIIGS’ when in 2011 also Ireland – not of course a southern 
country – had to take on the guarantee of banks’ debt). Apart from the most known and 
worrying case of Greece’s impoverishment, which got worse after fiscal practices imposed by 
the EU (Bitzenis et al., 2013), the official studies concerning Italy show that from 2007 to 
2013 the net wealth of households decreased from 9,500 to 8,728 billion euro (2013 prices), 
with a drop of over 8% (Banca d’Italia, 2014, p. 5). In the same years, the concentration of net 
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wealth grew so much that in 2012 the richest 10% of the population owned 46.6% of the 
wealth (compared to 41% twenty years before).  
 
The most widely used measure for income inequality is notoriously the ‘Gini coefficient’, a 
number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (everyone has the same 
income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (one person has all the income and 
everyone else has zero income). A recent comparison within the EU shows that southern 
European countries – such as Cyprus (CY), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT) and Spain 
(ES) – are among those characterized by the highest values of the Gini coefficient (Figure 3). 
The others are the post-Soviet countries of eastern Europe – Bulgaria (BG), Estonia (EE), 
Hungary (HR), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL) and Romania (RO) –, whose socio-
economic conditions of course are strongly influenced by their different political regime in 
the recent past and the sudden transition to a market economy from the 1990s. Moreover, the 
analysis of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient across the EU countries in the 
period 2008-2012 ‘showed high levels of inequality across southern Europe’, while ‘there is 
no dominant pattern in central- and northern-European countries’ (Di Falco, 2014, p. 2). 
 
FIGURE 3 INDICATIVELY HERE 
 
In light of the spatial valence of the crisis’ unequal effects, it is legitimate to ask whether – 
amongst the many aspects involved – the systems of spatial governance and planning may be 
considered one variable in the equation. The relevant suffering of southern European 
countries and cities (Knieling and Othengraphen, 2016; Ponzini, 2016) leads one to wonder, 
in particular, whether also their systems of spatial governance and planning may be part of the 
problem. In general terms, the high complexity of the matter and the current lack of more 
specific analyses exclude the establishment of certain and exhaustive correlations between the 
operation of spatial governance and planning systems and the effects of crisis, as well as too 
firm conclusions about this point. However, comparing the different mechanisms through 
which different types of system manage in different ways the social distribution of profits and 
losses in spatial development can at least ‘offer insights regarding how the planning apparatus 
in various different urban contexts might have been leveraged or manipulated in the run-up to 
the financial crisis’ (Siemiatycki and Siemiatycki, 2016, p. 1259). Such comparison is 
possible within Europe, thanks to international comparative research in the field of spatial 
Page 6 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ceps
European Planning Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 7 
governance and planning, which has matured in the last decades in coincidence with the EU 
integration process.   
 
 
The evolving comparison of spatial planning systems in Europe 
 
The first ‘comparative study’ of spatial planning systems in Europe (Table 1) was part of a 
survey on public control of the spatial development, commissioned by the British government 
in the late 1980s (Davies et al., 1989). Focused on five States of north-western Europe – 
namely Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (particularly England) and 
West Germany –, this study adopted the ‘legal basis’, in more detailed terms of legal certainty 
provided by the system, as the sole analytical criterion. It led to the distinction of two broad 
‘legal families’ of planning systems: a) the Continental family, based on the legal traditions of 
Roman law, the “Napoleonic Code” and the Scandinavian law, merged into the modern age in 
the juridical model of civil law; and b) the English family, inspired by the juridical model of 
the common law. In particular, while the continental legal systems (Nadin and Stead, 2008, p. 
38) 
 
seek to create a complete set of abstract rules and principles in advance of decision-making […], 
the English common law system offers far fewer rules. Government does not provide a 
complete set of legal rules in advance, rather the law has been built up case-by-case as decisions 
of the courts are recorded.  
 
TABLE 1 INDICATIVELY HERE 
 
A few years later, other British authors have tried to apply the same analytical criterion to the 
planning systems of as many as 14 European states (Newman and Thornley, 1996), taking as 
reference the models of legal system defined by the most known international studies of 
comparative constitutional law. This resulted in the distribution of the systems analysed in 
four families – i.e. Germanic, Scandinavian, Napoleonic, British – with the addition, in the 
absence of cases analysed, of the east-European family or of a family ‘in transition’ from the 
Soviet influence. This initial comparative approach however proved to have various 
limitations, namely the abstraction of the real variety of the planning practices, and a tendency 
to overemphasize the role of the legal and administrative structures. Other analyses began 
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 8 
therefore to consider further contextual variables, like property markets’ behaviours as 
observable in representative cities (Berry and McGreal, 1995). 
 
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC, 1997), the first EU 
attempt to investigate the field of spatial governance and planning in a systematic way, 
adopted a more complex approach in order to position the planning systems of the then 15 EU 
member States. Here the legal context is one of seven ‘interrelated factors’ that were used to 
analyse and distinguish planning systems, namely (ibid., p. 34): 
 
1) the scope of the system; 
2) the extent and type of planning at national and regional levels; 
3) the locus of power; 
4) the relative roles of public and private sectors; 
5) constitutional provisions and administrative traditions; 
6) the maturity or completeness of the system; 
7) the distance between expressed objectives and outcomes. 
 
This led to the identification of four ‘ideal types’ of planning system existing in the EU  – 
namely the ‘regional economic planning approach’, the ‘comprehensive integrated approach’, 
the ‘land use management’, and the ‘urbanism tradition’ (ibid., pp. 36-37) – representing 
approximate reference models to guide an understanding of the concerned systems. Despite a 
considerable caution in judgments, the EU compendium makes, albeit implicitly, some first 
assumptions of comparative evaluation of systems, which are suggested by the formulation of 
the last two ‘factors’ that are listed above. At a distance of a dozen years, Nadin and Stead 
(2009) – the first was one of the compendium’s authors – have revealed the summary of 
evaluations that emerges from the intersection of the seven factors with the four ideal types 
(Table 2). In particular, this summary highlights – even if the compendium was careful not to 
make explicit these conclusions – the lower maturity of system and the wider distance 
between goals and outcomes (or lesser effectiveness) of the ‘urbanism tradition’ 
characterizing the southern European countries. 
 
TABLE 2 INDICATIVELY HERE 
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 9 
Overall, progress and challenges in this nascent field of comparative analysis have mainly 
served to emphasize the need to define the ‘nature’ of a system of spatial governance and 
planning for a better understanding. Further reflections on the role of the ‘planning cultures’ 
in guiding the operation of the systems (Sayal, 2005; Knieling and Othengraphen, 2009) and 
on the final outcomes of the systems’ action (Janin Rivolin, 2008; Muñoz Gielen and Tasan-
Kok, 2010) have thus led to more advanced methodological considerations (Nadin, 2012) and 
to more careful comparative analyses (Reimer et al., 2014).  
 
In this evolving debate, the observation that spatial governance and planning systems are 
‘institutional technologies’ (Janin Rivolin, 2012) can be of particular value as regards what is 
discussed here. A technological approach, aware at the same time of the institutional nature of 
the processes in question, focuses on the overall effectiveness of the system in relation to 
expected results. In the case under discussion, it helps to compare how systems based on 
different mechanisms to assign the rights for spatial development can achieve different effects 
in the related distribution of profits and losses, thus attenuating or amplifying the unequal 
effects of the current crisis. In this respect, and excluding the ‘exception’ of the eastern 
countries previously subjected to the influence of the Soviet regime (Balchin et al., 1999, pp. 
161-192; Adams et al., 2011; Maier, 2012), three models can be currently recognized in 
Europe.  
 
 
Three models of rights assignation for spatial development 
  
The ‘conformative’ model affecting southern Europe 
 
The institutionalization of modern spatial governance and planning put down roots in the 
phase of industrial and bourgeois revolution and the formation of modern States (Taylor, 
1998; Hall, 2002). In the past century, particularly, the pressing needs of greater urbanization, 
of Fordist development and of post-war reconstruction have supported the establishment of a 
model for the public control of space based on the ideals of hierarchy (top-down relations 
between planning tiers) and of dirigisme (State-led implementation of plans) almost 
everywhere in the world. The universal success of the model, which has resulted in a 
pervasive consolidation throughout the whole western world, depends precisely on its 
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 10 
operating through the progressive assignation of rights for land use and for spatial 
development, as the main legal effect of urban plans. In times of greatest change and 
uncertainty, this model could indeed ensure some degree of ‘certainty’: to owners and 
developers for their investments, and to public authorities and reformist planners, convinced 
that it was thus possible to ‘conform’ any project of property development to public strategies. 
 
This traditional model of a spatial planning system, still largely prevailing in the world and 
applied in southern European countries, can be labelled as the ‘conformative’ model, as it 
pursues literally a ‘correspondence in form, manner, or character’ or actions ‘in accordance 
with some specified standard or authority’ (Janin Rivolin, 2008, p. 168). It pivots on a 
‘preventive’ binding zoning of a comprehensive urban area, which implies in general that:  
 
a) a public spatial strategy is transposed in a binding plan, which assigns rights for land 
use and for spatial development;  
b) based on this rights assignation, the delivery of building permits is subject to a control 
of the proposed development projects in terms of conformity (whether they conform to 
the plan);  
c) if projects are considered for any reason preferable to the existing assignation of rights, 
a new plan (or a substantive variation of the existing one) is needed in order to assign 
new rights for land use and spatial development. 
 
In Europe, countries like Greece, Italy, Spain and, to some extent, France and Portugal have 
shown a structural path dependence on their ‘urbanism tradition’, characterized by ‘a strong 
architectural flavour and concern with urban design, townscape and building control’, and by 
regulations ‘undertaken through rigid zoning and codes’ (CEC, 1997, p. 37). But this 
allegiance to the traditional model of spatial governance and planning has proven to be 
deleterious over time in terms of ‘public-value capturing’, which means ‘the level at which 
public bodies manage to make developers pay for public infrastructure – infrastructure 
provision, public roads and space, public facilities and buildings, affordable and social 
housing – and eventually capture part of the economic value increase’ (Muñoz Gielen and 
Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1097).  
 
For if the public authorities claim to rule the spatial ordering through the ‘preventive’ overall 
assignment of rights of land use and of spatial development (for the effect of zoning plans and 
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variants), the first overall outcome of the model is the progressive generation of property 
incomes. While the privatization of profits derivable from the spatial development is thus 
guaranteed (even in the absence of development), this is not the case of the social loss 
compensation that may arise from development. The public control of respective projects at 
the time of issuing the building permit is in fact reduced, in general, to mere formal aspects of 
conformance with the plan. In point of law, a permit to build in conformity with the plan, 
even if the project proves to imply unexpected social costs, cannot be denied. While spatial 
development for private (and speculative) interests is thus incentivized, the public control of 
development projects is generally reduced, despite more or less genuine expectations, to a 
mere ‘administrative formality’, with the possible creation of patronage and corruptive 
practices (Vettoretto, 2009). 
 
Ultimately, the spatial planning systems that regulate the spatial ordering practices in southern 
European countries, still strongly impregnated with their ‘urbanism tradition’ and the cult of 
preventive binding zoning as a guarantee of the public interest, are shown in fact to condition 
the public strategies of development to the advantage of the most relevant private interests. 
This may have contributed to create in the long run the speculative urban markets on which 
the current crisis has posed its foundations. But especially in the years of crisis, despite the 
search for more stable markets by investors (Mattarocci and Pekdemir, 2015) and thus a 
general decline in local real estate values (Abate and Losa, 2017), this has contributed to 
boost – rather than alleviate – the effects of progressive social inequality, continuing to 
support the process of privatization of profits and socialization of losses in the spatial 
development.  
 
 
The British ‘performative’ model  
 
As suggested above, one remarkable price paid in exchange for the certainty afforded by the 
conformative model was the ‘rigidity’ of public strategies, inhibited somehow by the 
progressive creation of binding rights on land and of additional property incomes. Inspired by 
the juridical tradition of common law, the United Kingdom reacted early to this problem with 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. This law put the right to build in the hands of the 
Crown (i.e. the State) and established that ‘the development plan did not of itself imply that 
permission would be granted for particular developments simply because they appeared to be 
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in conformity with the plan’; rather ‘in granting permission to develop, local authorities could 
impose “such conditions as they think fit”’ (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002, p. 93). As a 
consequence, in the UK ‘[a]ll the owners were thus placed in the position of owning only the 
existing (1947) use rights and values in their land’ (ibid., p. 21), and the British spatial 
planning system became ‘fundamentally a discretionary system in which decisions on 
particular development proposals are made as they arise, against the policy background of a 
generalised plan’ (ibid., p. 92). The new system was completed by the 1968 Town and 
Country Planning Act, assigning to structure plans the provision of strategic orientations for 
development and to local plans (non-mandatory and concerning only specific areas) the 
provision of detailed guidance on land use. Despite various subsequent changes, ‘[t]he 
essential features of the 1968 system are still in place today’ (ibid., p. 93; Nadin and Stead, 
2014).  
 
This different type of spatial planning system, established in the UK (especially England), 
Ireland and some Commonwealth countries since the post-war period (Booth, 2007), can be 
labelled as the ‘performative’ model by virtue of its distinct address to ‘the execution of an 
action’ or ‘the fulfilment of a claim, promise, or request’ (Janin Rivolin, 2008, p. 168). It is 
based on indicative and non-binding zoning for the comprehensive urban area, which means 
in general that:  
 
a) a public spatial strategy is transposed into a non-binding plan, i.e. not having juridical 
implications for the assignation of rights for land use and for spatial development;  
b) for this reason, the delivery of building permits is subject to control and the 
negotiation of the proposed development projects in order to ensure their performance 
towards the plan (i.e. their capacity to perform the public strategy);  
c) new rights for land use and for spatial development are assigned contextually with the 
possible delivery of the building permit. 
 
Although it may seem counterintuitive, removing from the spatial plan the power to establish 
rules that are legally binding does not weaken, but rather strengthens, the action of public 
authorities. Without legal obligations, the public authority manages in fact to reserve the right 
to assign new rights only to those projects that have been checked – and possibly improved, 
after negotiation – in their ability to pursue (or ‘perform’) the spatial strategy. In this model, 
unlike the previous one, the ‘developmental’ and ‘regulatory’ functions of the spatial planning 
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system (Healey and Williams, 1993, p. 702) are therefore well separated between the 
activities of spatial planning and of (actual) development control. As a matter of fact, in the 
UK ‘the main substance of the planning system is administered by governmental profession 
planning officers, either within forward planning teams (responsible for preparing planning 
policies) or development control teams (responsible for determining applications for planning 
permission by individuals and organisations)’ (Tewdwr-Jones, 1996, p. 1). 
 
With the passing of time, while the urban regeneration needs have taken over on the large 
urban expansions, the performative model seems to have ensured greater ‘flexibility’ to public 
action of spatial governance. On the other hand, uncertainty, discretionary decisions and 
higher administrative costs are the limitations complained about most frequently in the case of 
the British system (Faludi, 1987; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999; Booth, 2007). The loss of certainty 
supplied by the original model is complained about mainly by property owners and 
developers, but also often by planners, whose choices and behaviours – deprived of a ‘legal’ 
power – are more exposed to political and social judgment. Be that as it may, it seems that an 
institutional device that allows the public authorities to decide if, when and what is allowed to 
be built – not in a general plan, but after specific project control – is crucial in order to ensure 
an effective public government over the distribution of profits and losses in spatial 
development. This does not mean, of course, that all spatial developments in the UK or 
Ireland are automatically ‘more equal’ than elsewhere, but simply that, in principle, public 
powers in those countries are endowed with more effective means to manage economic and 
social effects of the spatial development. 
 
In the years of crisis, Ireland had to take on the guarantee of banks’ debt in 2011 and in the 
UK, as a possible collateral effect of global trends, the majority of citizens voted for leaving 
the EU in a referendum in 2016. But in the same years these countries did not record an 
increase of inequalities like the southern European countries (Di Falco, 2014). Moreover, a 
renewed emphasis over local control in the British planning system (Haughton and 
Allmendinger, 2011, 2013) might be witness of an attempt to leverage the particular and 
better capacities of this model. 
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The spread of a ‘neo-performative’ model in north-western Europe  
 
Despite their juridical regime of civil law and the constitutional linkage between land 
ownership and right to build (as opposed to the UK), other European countries have 
experienced over time the need to reform their spatial planning systems in order to pursue the 
effects of the performative model. The evidence of decision-making difficulties in growing 
societal complexity (Dahrendorf, 1968; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), on the one hand, and 
the Fordism crisis, the explosion of globalization and the consequent processes of spatial 
reorganization (Harvey, 1989; Amin and Thrift, 1994), on the other, have indeed highlighted 
further the limits of the conformative model of spatial governance and planning. The 
difficulty of plan implementation in the context of reconciling multilevel collective strategies 
to a growing plurality of local and individual projects of spatial development has been faced 
through substantial reforms in the north-western European countries – for instance Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands – favoured perhaps by their traditional 
‘comprehensive integrated approach’ to spatial planning (CEC, 1997, pp. 36-37).   
 
Sweden has tried early on to emulate the UK in establishing a spatial planning system that 
distinguishes, at the urban level, between the ‘general plan’ (ӧversiktsplan), mandatory but 
not legally binding, and the ‘detailed plan’ (detaljplan), legally binding but optional for some 
limited areas (Lundström et al., 2013). Also in Germany, as confirmed with the reforms that 
followed the country’s reunification in the 1990s, the ‘zoning plan’ (F-plan) is binding on the 
administrative activities but has no legal value on property. The legally binding tools on the 
land use are the so-called ‘building plans’ (B-plan), which cover only some specific areas of 
the municipal territory that are generally indicated by the F-plan (Schmidt, 2009). In Denmark, 
the 2000 Planning Act introduced the concept of ‘municipal planning strategies’, which meant 
that ‘the scope of planning at the municipal level was formally extended beyond its traditional 
focus […] to encompass more pro-active and strategic modes of planning’ (Damsgaard, 2014, 
p. 48). Despite the formal rigidity of the Dutch system and criticism on more recent reforms 
(Buitelaar et al., 2011), in fact, municipalities have been allowed for a long time ‘to delineate 
the boundaries of the plan area’ without any ‘legal prescription [...] to determine when a land-
use plan should be approved in relation to the rest of the development process’ (Muñoz 
Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1121). This has resulted in (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016, p. 
1287) 
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a collaboration between private and public actors […] with arrangements about the building 
programme, the urban design as well as phasing of the various aspects of the area development, 
supported by a land account, upon which the plan would ultimately be turned into a legally 
binding land-use plan.  
 
A third type of spatial planning system can be thus labelled as a ‘neo-performative’ model 
insofar as, while continuing to be based on binding zoning, it has neutralized in one way or 
another the ‘preventive’ legal effectiveness of the plan. Rather, as discussed for the British 
model, new spatial development rights are assigned as a ‘final balance’ after development 
projects (at least the main ones) have been negotiated, and thus controlled in detail by the 
public authority before that plan has assumed the force of law. Therefore, in this case:  
 
a) a public spatial strategy for the comprehensive urban area is used as a basis for the 
collection of projects, their control and negotiation, which are finalized to share their 
final form and substance;  
b) a binding plan assigns consequently the rights for land use and for spatial 
development;  
c) building permits are delivered according to the plan.  
 
‘In the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark’, in practice (Muñoz Gielen and Tasan-
Kok, 2010, p. 1100),  
 
binding land-use rules (whether this concerns a new land-use plan or a modification of one to 
create new building possibilities) are only approved once negotiations with 
developers/landowners have taken place or, at least, when there is enough certainty about their 
successfully conclusion.  
 
Despite the same juridical regime of southern European countries, their systems of spatial 
governance and planning tend thus to reproduce the operational advantages of the 
performative model in terms of ‘public-value capturing’. As in the case of the performative 
model, and unlike the conformative model, the neo-performative model prevents a ‘blind’ 
pre-assignation of rights for land use and for spatial development through the plan, and 
postpones the assignation of rights until after the public control of development projects. 
Privatization of profits derivable from spatial development is therefore not guaranteed by the 
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plan and may even be at least partly transformed in compensation for social losses that could 
arise from the spatial development. This can occur thanks to public control of the spatial 
projects that – in the absence of acquired rights – can be extended to their overall performance 
with respect to the plan objectives.  
 
This seems to have created in the long run more stable urban markets (Mattarocci and 
Pekdemir, 2015), because the speculative purposes are generally discouraged. The German 
urban markets, for instance, have been considered for a long time ‘boring’ by international 
investors, who preferred deals elsewhere, such as in southern and eastern European countries. 
But, as the shrewder realtors suggest: ‘“Boring” real estate offers gradual, stable increases in 
property value over long-term periods of time, that provide a predictable return on investment’ 
(Hartman, 2014, p. 1). After the crisis had started to hit Europe, indeed, investors suddenly 
became very interested in the German urban markets, because of the rather robust real estate 
values, which have remained stable throughout the last ten years (Just and Maennig, 2016). 
And this has rewarded somehow this country, in comparison to others, bringing new financial 
resources even in difficult times.   
 
 
The crisis as a possible breaking point 
 
Overall, the three models described above (Figure 4) show that different combinations 
between plan and control devices within a spatial governance system are possible, and can 
achieve very different effects in the whole process of spatial, economic and social ordering. 
The historical evolution of these models also shows that the systems of spatial governance 
and planning are not immutable, but may change over time. Moreover, a common adherence 
to the legal tradition of civil law and to the constitutional relationship between land ownership 
and right to build – unlike the UK, and similarly to southern European countries – by the 
States that are applying the neo-performative model has been highlighted. This is perhaps the 
best evidence that the legal system established does not predetermine once and forever the 
whole operation of the spatial governance system and, therefore, cannot become an excuse to 
give up on change. 
 
FIGURE 4 INDICATIVELY HERE 
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However, it must be observed that the systems of spatial governance and planning are very 
complex social constructs, which can be seen as an ‘institutional technology of government’, 
operating ‘as a hinge between the government system […] and the spatial production and 
consumption system’ (Mazza, 2003, p. 54, translated). This means that systems of spatial 
governance and planning not only contribute to design citizenship (Mazza, 2015), but also by 
their nature are themselves shaped by the social structure and change (Nadin and Stead, 2008, 
2009).  
 
In principle, a spatial governance and planning system is potentially oriented, like any other 
technology, to renovate its own ‘capabilities’: in this case the command options of the 
‘government system’ on the ‘spatial production and consumption system’, which in general is 
led by individual profit and thus equally pressed by the search for innovation (Harvey, 1989; 
Lefebvre, 1992). Paraphrasing Schumpeter (1949), a planning system is continuously called 
upon to provide the public action with a ‘creative response’, because any simply ‘adaptive 
response’ is driven to leave the production of space the permanent hostage of prevailing 
interests of individual profit. However, ‘in practice the process to adopt changes is rather slow 
and restrained by high transactions costs’ (Fürst, 2009, p. 31), because of path dependence 
(Booth, 2011; Sorensen, 2015), the complexity of institutional processes and the conditions 
imposed by political conflict and economic dynamics, against the background of innate social 
struggle for land use control (Plotkin, 1987).  
 
In current times, ‘the loss of legitimacy of existing institutions resulting from crisis allows a 
heightened opportunity for policy entrepreneurs or other actors to reshape existing institutions 
and create new arrangements’; as far as spatial governance is concerned, ‘[p]articularly 
important is the specification of the rules that apply to new capital investment in urban space, 
and the distribution of the costs and benefits of such investment’ (Sorensen, 2015, pp. 25-26). 
Ultimately, the current crisis might pose the conditions to allow that the more obsolete 
systems of spatial governance and planning, which contribute to limit the socioeconomic 
development of southern European cities and countries, are improved according to the better 
performance of other models. On the other hand, institutional change in the field of spatial 
governance and planning is not easy for the aforementioned reasons. In this light, the most 
worrying suspicion is that the southern European systems will have a hope to be substantially 
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changed only when the social costs of crisis will have overcome the ‘transactions costs’ that 
have prevented so far this opportunity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Basically, ‘there is a bidirectional relationship between planning and the crisis’ (Ponzini, 2016, 
p. 1239):  
 
On the one hand, urban planning contributed to the conditions for the mortgage and financial 
bubble to occur by seconding the real estate market and allowing great surpluses in different 
manners. On the other, the crises and their subsequent stages showed the weaknesses of 
planning systems in different countries and put pressure on their reform or reorientation. 
 
It is arguable, to a certain extent, that in Europe the effects of crisis and the weakening of 
planning have been boosted since most EU countries and the European Commission have 
based their economic policies on the neoliberal free market ideology (Kunzmann, 2016). 
Comprehending the variety of the European context, however, has been valuable to 
understand that different systems of spatial governance and planning may have had different 
impacts on the crisis evolution, especially with regard to its effects of increasing inequalities. 
In particular, the southern European countries, which are more seriously affected by the 
unequal effects of crisis, are still ruled by ‘conformative’ systems of spatial governance and 
planning. In spite of the most ancient customs and noble expectations, these prove incapable 
of ensuring an effective public government of the ‘production of space’ in the contemporary 
socio-economic contexts.  
 
It is clear that the extreme complexity of the matter and the absence of more systematic 
analysis to this respect impede too assertive conclusions. It seems difficult to deny, however, 
that a balanced social distribution of profits and losses resulting from the spatial development 
– always desirable, but essential in times of crisis – can be achieved with some effectiveness 
if, as these systems determine, new rights on land use and on spatial development are 
allocated in advance of an effective public control of development projects. Ultimately, it 
(Muñoz Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010, p. 1126) 
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seems that when municipalities fix development possibilities early in the development process, 
this might stimulate land price increases and might also lead to the loss of a valuable negotiation 
tool. Municipalities might be giving away their ‘treasure’: that of being the only institution 
entitled to decide, with certain discretionary powers, if, when and what is allowed to be built.  
 
This appears to have been understood over time in other European countries, which have 
modified the operation of their respective systems of spatial governance and planning long 
before the crisis. Their ‘performative’ systems ensure thus that in one way (e.g. the UK) or 
another (e.g. some north-western European countries) new rights on propriety are assigned 
only after that the related projects of development have been controlled by the public 
authority and appropriately renegotiated to rebalance profits and losses within the urban 
community. This does not mean, of course, that these systems are immune from the pressure 
of crisis (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016), nor that they should not be improved. The effects of 
crisis have suggested, looking for instance at the British system, possible reforms in order to 
make it less ‘growth dependent’ in future (Rydin, 2013). This kind of proposal assumes, 
however, that a minimum of ‘planning gain’ is already ensured by the system that needs 
improvement. In other words, one precondition is that ‘[p]olicies that weaken this regulatory 
control, for example, by establishing a firm presumption in favour of development’ (ibid., p. 
45) are already prevented by the system, which does not happen in the conformative model.  
 
More in general, the coexistence of such different systems of spatial governance in Europe 
poses serious problems to the effectiveness of the EU policies (Janin Rivolin, 2008). Looking 
beyond Europe, the circumstance that the traditional conformative system is arguably still 
prevalent in the world may suggest to the vast majority of ‘careless’ planning scholars 
(Siemiatycki and Siemiatycki, 2016) a commitment far more effective than simply 
complaining against the neoliberal turn (Moroni, 2016). After all, if ‘a bridge exists from the 
technical knowledge that planners embrace to the institutional change that seems necessary 
for planning to be effective’ (Beauregard, 2005, p. 206), this is made by an increased public 
awareness of the crucial role that the whole system of spatial governance and planning plays 
for economic, social and even political life. Against the global crisis, rather than engaging in 
‘sophisticated international academic discourse aiming to bridge theory and practice and to 
come from knowledge to action’ (Kunzmann, 2016, p. 1317), the planning scholars should 
foster this awareness.  
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Figure 1: Size of economy (GDP in trillions euro) and wealth per person (GDP per person) in the main 
economies of the world, 2013 (source: europa.eu).  
FIGURE 1 INDICATIVELY HERE  
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Figure 2: GDP per inhabitant in the 28 EU member States in 2014: index where the average is 100 (source: 
europa.eu).  
FIGURE 2 INDICATIVELY HERE  
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Figure 3: Gini coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for disposable household income in EU Member 
States, 2012 income year (source: CEC, 2016).  
FIGURE 3 INDICATIVELY HERE  
103x56mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
 
 
Page 28 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ceps
European Planning Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
  
 
 
Table 1: Most known typologies of spatial planning systems in Europe (source: Nadin and Stead, 2009).  
TABLE 1 INDICATIVELY HERE  
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Table 2: Traditions and criteria from the EU Compendium of spatial planning systems and policies (source: 
Nadin and Stead, 2009).  
TABLE 2 INDICATIVELY HERE  
436x191mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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Figure 4: Three models of spatial governance systems (adaptation on: Knieling et al., 2016).  
FIGURE 4 INDICATIVELY HERE  
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Response to the reviewer 
 
Comments - Referee 1 Author’s answers and corrections 
The paper starts from a very provocative and 
stimulating idea: the real estate and financial crisis 
which started 2007/2008 relates to European 
planning systems. The distributive impact of the 
crisis, the idea continues, also depends on the 
nature of the respective planning system. 
This is correct, although the author’s intention is not 
intended to be provocative. The paper’s attempt is 
simply to recall the attention on the institutional and 
political value of the overall system of spatial 
governance and planning, which in some European 
countries seems to be recognized better than in 
others. The context of global crisis supplies a 
suitable opportunity for doing so.  
Some corrections have been included throughout 
the paper in order to avoid the (annoying) 
impression of being provocative. 
Unfortunately, the author fails to implement this idea 
in the course of the paper. Rather, a misleading 
representation of European planning systems takes 
over the narrative. This representation distinguishes 
between performative, neo-performative, and 
preventive planning systems. 
A distinction between conformative, performative 
and neo-performative planning systems has already 
been welcomed by the scientific literature, as shown 
by various references in the paper. Such possible 
modelling can be of course rejected as “misleading”, 
but the proposed article limits itself to resume it 
against the backdrop of the global crisis. 
Having said this, however, various amendments 
have been made especially in section 4, according 
to the following and more detailed reviewer’s 
observations, in order to achieve a less misleading 
representation.  
None of these systems is properly examined from 
the perspective of spatial justice (as promised in the 
article's title). 
It is true that the topic of spatial justice is addressed 
much too indirectly by this paper, which certainly 
does not justify the mention in the title. On the other 
hand, the space allowed for one article prevents 
facing this topic with the complexity of arguments 
that would be deserved.  
The term “spatial justice” has been therefore deleted 
from the article’s title, and specific references to this 
topic have been also eliminated from the text.  
Also, it remains unclear why performative, neo-
performative, or preventive planning would have had 
ANY impact on the financial crisis. 
The proposed article argues that, having a different 
effect in the public control of the social distribution of 
profits and losses in spatial development, the three 
models of planning systems are not set to 
counteract the unequal effects of the crisis with the 
same effectiveness.  
However, further implications with regard to the 
preconditions for investors on the real estate 
markets have been added in section 4, according to 
what is discussed below. 
The reviewer remembers quite well from before 
2007, that German land markets were considered 
"boring" by international investors, who preferred the 
UK and Ireland, but also countries in Southern and 
Eastern Europe. Many a shopping mall was put into 
the landscape, with little or no regard to the 
aspirations of local planners. After the crisis had 
started to hit Europe, however, investors suddenly 
became very interested in "boring" land deals in 
Germany. The reason for the re-allocation of funds 
was not the nature of the German planning system, 
but the rather robust market value of real estate in 
Germany. Surely, this has nothing to do with the -- 
wrong -- characterization of the German planning 
system as "neo-performative". 
This is an interesting objection. In the author’s view, 
however, it does not weaken but supports the 
paper’s arguments. The point is that the proposed 
article does not differentiate the planning systems 
for the “performance” of respective real estate 
markets but, more simply, for their capacity of public 
control on spatial development. In this view, the 
“boring” real estate market in Germany can be seen 
(also) as one consequence of more effective public 
regulation in the long run (less speculation is 
allowed). As in times of crisis investment choices 
become wiser, the sudden attentions of investors for 
the German real estate market after 2008 are also 
understandable. And these have rewarded 
somehow this country, in comparison to others, 
bringing new financial resources even in difficult 
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times.   
These considerations have been included in section 
4. 
In Ireland and Greece, the financial crisis also was 
influenced by peculiar tax practices (with no 
connection to the planning system). 
This is certainly true (also in consequence of the EU 
impositions). However, the proposed article does not 
argue at all that the planning systems are the unique 
reason of countries’ trends with respect to the crisis. 
It recalls more simply that also the spatial planning 
systems are one variable in the equation, and tries 
to argue how this variable should be understood.  
Some amendments have been made to the text, 
especially in the introductive and concluding 
sections, in order to avoid this possible 
misunderstanding. 
The paper claims that the countries of Southern 
Europe (why not also Republic of Ireland?) are 
entrenched in preventive planning from which fact 
the author concludes that these countries inevitably 
will remain in crisis. This conclusion is not 
convincing. 
This is not completely exact. The proposed article 
argues rather that: a) a conformative planning 
system can be one reason of the increasing 
inequalities of South European countries, especially 
in times of crisis (section 4); and b) if so, these 
countries should improve their systems according to 
the better performance of the other models, but 
institutional change is not easy for various reasons 
(section 5).   
As regards Ireland, it is true that this country had to 
take on the guarantee of banks’ debt in 2011, but 
was the second in the EU for GDP per inhabitant in 
2014 (fig. 2) and, however, seems to be less hit by 
the problems of unequal distribution of wealth that 
characterize especially the southern (and eastern) 
countries. As far as the author is aware, the Irish 
planning system operates similarly to the British one, 
albeit with some differences. One might conclude 
that even a performative planning system cannot 
guarantee the refinancing of the government debt, 
but such a discussion would lead the article away 
from its more modest ambitions. 
Amendments have been made, however, throughout 
the text in order to clarify these issues. The title of 
section 5 has been also changed.  
The reviewer does not buy into the accusation of 
neo-liberalism which is so prevalent in contemporary 
planning and geography literature.  
Also the author believes that an excessive emphasis 
on the faults of the neoliberal turn – which are 
however demonstrable to a certain extent – can 
divert the attention of planners and planning 
authorities from the matter of which they are mainly 
responsible. This is one reason that has motivated 
the proposed article. 
This point has been clarified in the conclusions. 
The reviewer insists, however, that academic 
reasoning must take into account all facts and 
theories available. And both the factual and the 
theoretical foundation of the strong conclusion are 
insufficient. The reviewer is convinced that the 
author has not yet identified and employed all 
possible arguments. Hence, the recommendation for 
a major revision. 
From the author’s view this is the most valuable 
objection, for which the reviewer should be thanked.  
A major revision of the proposed article has been 
therefore carried out in accordance with all the 
detailed observations that were addressed above, in 
order both to consider further arguments and to 
lighten the impression of a much too "strong 
conclusion" (which the complexity of the matter 
cannot allow).  
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